Abstract
Allow them to take the reins: Why Central Asian states need to lead in
Afghanistan. By: Brandon Angel
Looking at the United States’ ‘forever war’ coming to an end in Afghanistan, the
United States' foreign policy must re-establish and re-think their policy proposals
for the region. The twenty-year war in Afghanistan, and the quick recapture of
Afghanistan by Taliban forces, show that the cultural change wanted in
Afghanistan is a failing policy for the United States. This paper argues that the
Central Asian states, specifically Uzbekistan, must lead in the region’s security
and stability. Reasons are given that re-interventionist policy in Afghanistan will
only lead to more foreign policy blunders. For future stability in the region, the
Central Asian states have many reasons to want a stable Afghanistan. Reasoning
included are the military cost within the NDAA, the cost of American lives, and
the possible refugee crisis that will stem from an Afghanistan collapse. Ideas are
discussed for allowing more funding for defensive equipment to the Central Asian
states and communication equipment to bolster their borders with Afghanistan to
reduce the likelihood of ISIS-K forces slipping back into neighboring Central
Asian states and attempting to use Afghanistan as a ‘road map’ for further Islamic
fundamentalism.
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The recent withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan had led many within
D.C. to attest that the United States is facing a possible threat within 6-12 months
from Taliban forces. Some in D.C. have stated that the United States is less safe
now than before without a permanent military base.
The United States must allow Central Asian states to take a more proactive role in
the country’s security and diplomacy with the Taliban. The ground situation
remains that ISIS-K and Taliban forces will fight for control over the country.
Attacks within Afghanistan will continue as the Taliban continues to try and
maintain some semblance of security within the country. The United States should
not seek military intervention in the inevitable fighting and civil war that seems
on the brink in Afghanistan.
The Taliban and ISIS-K forces fighting for one another could continue
destabilizing the region if the Central Asian states do not take a leading role in
negotiations. The United States should allow those nations to take the lead role in
ensuring stability.
The United States Cannot Afford Staying in Afghanistan
The United States, in fighting this twenty-year war in Afghanistan, has lost
valuable time, resources, and military members in trying to prop up a regime that
was never going to work. As Forbes Magazine concluded in August of 2020, “In
the 20 years since September 11, 2001, the United States has spent more than $2
trillion on the war in Afghanistan.”1 The United States was essentially throwing
money and resources at a problem that would not work. Costing the American
taxpayer trillions of dollars to maintain a war of this magnitude is unacceptable.
With so many domestic issues in the U.S., including lack of infrastructure, the
climate crisis, and the many social problems currently occurring within the
country, the cost-benefit analysis to stay in Afghanistan is lopsided. This financial
burden is partly the problem with the United States' occupation. It does not also
consider the military members lost because of the conflict.
Statistics from October 1 of this year concluded that, “As of October 1, 2021, the
United States had lost a total of 7,054 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan”2 This
1. Helman, Christopher. “The War in Afghanistan Cost America $300 Million per Day for 20
Years, with Big Bills Yet to Come.”
2. Statista, ed. “U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan by State 2021.”

report shows the high cost the servicemembers themselves have to continuously
pay in defending the ‘forever wars.’ These statistics only show part of the
problem as it is more expounded with costs to other nations’ servicemembers and
Afghanistan itself. A.P. News has final statistics on Afghanistan and what that
means for the United States, American service members killed in Afghanistan
through April: 2,448., U.S. contractors: 3,846., Afghan national military and
police: 66,000., Other allied service members, including from other NATO
member states: 1,144., Afghan civilians: 47,245., Taliban and other opposition
fighters: 51,191., Aid workers: 444., Journalists: 72.”3 The human cost of one of
America’s forever wars, by any account, is unsustainable. To have Americans
continuously fighting for a country that fell within weeks shows that the propping
of the government and its forces was never going to work.
Linda Bilmes of Harvard University reports a ripple effect of the war in
Afghanistan on our veterans, “…the United States has committed to pay in health
care, disability, burial, and other costs for roughly 4 million Afghanistan and Iraq
veterans: more than $2 trillion.”4 Trillions of dollars were spent on a war to
transform a nation from an authoritarian fundamentalist state into a democratic
one, which has overtly failed by any standard.
The United States needs to worry about its domestic problems first.
Afghanistan has been called the graveyard of empires for multiple reasons, and
the United States has joined the list of countries that have tried turning the country
into something more palatable for the aggressor nation. The Soviet Union, British
Empire, Mongol Khanate, and the United States have all tried to turn a more
conservative Islamic country into something that resembles a ‘democratic’ state.
The problem for Americans is that the culture there is not something that will
transform into a new democratic state in Central Asia fundamentally because of
those cultural differences. The idea that the Afghan population should accept a
complete change to their culture and society will not take hold.
Many within the foreign policy establishment in D.C. believe that the Afghan
people will accept the benevolence of the United States to make their country
better and more democratic. To think about the situation from the Afghan side,
they will not accept an aggressor nation to come in, change their government and
society, to a side that they deem decadent and impure. Afghanistan was never
3. Knickmeyer, Ellen. “Costs of the Afghanistan War, in Lives and Dollars.”
4. Bilmes, Linda. “The Long-Term Costs of United States Care for Veterans of the Afghanistan
and Iraq Wars.”

going to be a democratic state, nor should the United States try and change a
fundamentally Islamic country into a democratic one. Instead, the United States
should look inwards at its’ problems and show the upsides of democratic
liberalism if they wish more countries to change. The riots and hyper domestic
partisanship that has been on display for many years is not how to show a
liberalized democracy is the correct government to move forward. Allowing the
United States to be pulled apart domestically only shows to the international
community that we cannot solve our problems and Afghanistan’s. By forcing
liberal tenants on another country, that only spikes the resentment of the home
country and nationalist tendencies of the population there. The United States
continues to try and push liberal policies on other countries in an attempt to say
they are only trying to help the country in question. In his recent book, Great
Delusions, John Mearsheimer, Professor at the University of Chicago, states, “In
these circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard-nosed
behavior with liberal rhetoric.”5 Liberal policies abroad, and the attempt to
liberalize countries, only backfires when they attempt to push those policies on
others.
The Partisan animosity between the two major political parties in the United
States and the significant problems that the United States has only shows the
Afghan people that we cannot handle issues. Since the United States has so many
domestic issues, the United States should look to its significant problems before
trying to go abroad to spread democracy. For one problem, the infrastructure of
the United States is at, according to a CFR backgrounder, “averaged a “C-,” up
from a “D+” in 2017…[and that] an “infrastructure investment gap” of nearly
$2.6 trillion this decade that, if unaddressed, could cost the United States $10
trillion in lost GDP by 2039.”6 The infrastructure problem and the many social
woes of the country, including racial issues, voting rights, and congressional
deadlock in passing any beneficial legislation, do not show the Afghan people any
good governance. Instead, the problems show that the American democracy is
currently faltering and that major domestic fixes need to occur before any country
can look towards the United States as a ‘city on a hill.’
A continuing ISIS-K and Taliban war will sap each other of strength.
5. Mearsheimer, John J. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities.
6. McBride, James, and Anshu Siripurapu. “The State of U.S. Infrastructure.”

Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, stated in a recent United
States intelligence report that, “The intelligence community currently assesses
that both Isis-K [Islamic State Khorasan Province, the Afghanistan-based group]
and al-Qaida have the intent to conduct external operations, including against the
United States, but neither currently has the capability to do so. We could see ISISK generate that capability in somewhere between six or 12 months,”7 This
intelligence does come at a time when American attitudes towards terrorist attacks
and the awareness of attacks on Americans is highly volatile regarding the
Afghanistan withdrawal and the 13 American service members killed. American
interests are, first and foremost, to ensure that no more American service
members die, nor American citizens die at the hand of a terrorist sleeper cell or
lone wolf target within the United States.
However, according to a CSIS reporting in 2018, “ISIS-K has a fighting force of
between 600 and 800 militants as of October 2018. These numbers are down from
peak levels in 2016 when its fighting force numbered between 3,000 to 4,000
militants.”8 This group is consciously trying to recruit more members, especially
from more hardline elements within Afghanistan and the Central Asian states that
see the Taliban as a threat to Islam and their ‘pure’ ideology. A report by
Asfandyar Mir at the Wilson Center explains that tense relationship, “The enmity
between the two groups has been aggravated by sustained military hostilities, but
the main cause remains their sectarian difference. ISIS-K subscribes to the JihadiSalafism ideology — and plays up the ‘purity’ of its anti-idolatry credentials. The
Taliban, on the other hand, subscribe to an alternative Sunni Islamic sectarian
school, the Hanafi madhhab, which ISIS-K regards as deficient. The two groups
also differ over the role of nationalism. ISIS-K fiercely rejects it, which runs
counter to the Afghan Taliban’s aims of ruling over Afghanistan.”9 The two
terrorist powers within Afghanistan seem to be at each other’s throats instead of
attacking the United States. To see the Taliban and ISIS-K, in a civil war for the
country brings about ideas of how the United States had to deal with Taliban
attacks in the past. The United States had to fight an enemy that used suicide
bombings and IED (Improvised Explosive Device) attacks against their forces.
The Taliban now must deal with an enemy that has replicated the same attacks
7. “Islamic State in Afghanistan Could Have Capacity to Strike US next Year.” The Guardian.
8. “Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K).” Center for Strategic and International Studies.
9. Mir, Asfandyar. 2021. “The Isis-K Resurgence.” Wilson Center.

against them. The ISIS-K troops fighting against the Taliban forces will only
continue to sap each other of strength instead of mounting any concentrated effort
to fight the United States. The two sides in the continued fight will have to win
sides, and the majority of citizens of Afghanistan, to maintain their power.
Therefore, the Taliban government will have to figure out a way to ensure that
they stay ‘pure’ to their ideological movement without isolating the even more
extreme individuals that may stray to ISIS-K.
If the Taliban must continuously worry about ISIS-K threats and attacks, they do
not have the time to coordinate attacks against the west. They will have to worry
about their own security and the humanitarian crisis looming within the country.
ISIS-K is stepping up the attacks to ensure that the Taliban know that they are
there to fight what they deem to be an ‘impure’ version of Islam and are willing to
die to make the country ‘pure’ in their eyes. The disenfranchised youth that may
not be able to escape from Afghanistan, and see that the Taliban are brutal
oppressors, may join the ISIS forces to arm themselves against what they see as a
threat.
The Central Asian states should handle the refugee problems
The biggest denominator that kept ISIS-K and the Taliban from fighting each
other was the American forces within Afghanistan. With American troops gone,
the two powers will only continue to fight one another in an inevitable civil war
that will perhaps kill thousands, with millions displaced or living under a terrible
humanitarian crisis.
One of the biggest problems that will occur under this coming fight is the refugee
crisis that will cause problems within the region and abroad. The United Nations
refugee agency (UNHCR) has projected that “a half million Afghans may seek to
leave by the end of 2021.”10 These refugees will be leaving to try and make a
better life, many of them seeking to get out before retribution can be brought on
them, especially those families and individuals that worked with the American
forces when they were stationed there.
This refugee crisis very well may occur if the Taliban cannot guarantee safety,
security, and a return to normalcy for the 40 million Afghan citizens against the
ISIS-K forces. The World Food Programme reported on October 25 that,
“the lives, livelihoods and access to food for 22.8 million people will be
severely impacted…more than one-in-two Afghans will face Phase 3 crisis or
10. “Half a Million Afghans Could Flee across Borders - UNHCR.” Reuters.

Phase 4 emergency levels of acute food insecurity from November
through the March lean season, requiring an urgent international response to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.”11 Such a significant humanitarian crisis
could see Afghan refugees trying to escape the problem and migrate into better
situations abroad.
The Central Asian states, having the land borders to Afghanistan, have the first
responsibility in helping out the refugees. Being that the central Asian states have
a closer heritage and societal similarities with Afghanistan than the United States
and the European States, they should be the ones to handle the refugees first. They
should be the ones to do the first vetting process and the initial contact and
humanitarian aid that the refugees may need
Americans should continue to help those refugees and interpreters that worked
with American forces, especially those with language skills. A BBC report in
August concluded that, “As many as 50,000 interpreters have worked with the
U.S. military. Since 2008, some 70,000 Afghans - interpreters and their families have moved to the U.S. under a special immigrant visa awarded for their service.
But some 20,000 interpreters and their families are still seeking a way out.”12
Veterans of all stripes are aware of the interpreters' sacrifices to help the
American forces in Afghanistan and see them as brothers in arms. In serving
alongside our troops, many Americans believe that these individuals deserve the
right to come here and should be given special immigrant visa status as soon as
possible. These individuals who have sacrificed their livelihoods to make
Afghanistan better did so at enormous personal risk. They cannot go back into
Afghanistan without massive personal risk to themselves and their families.
The Central Asian states need to take a prominent role in Stabilizing
Afghanistan
Each of the Central Asian states, especially those on the land border with
Afghanistan, will have to take a much more prominent role in policing their
borders, as well as dialogue and discussion with the Taliban government. The
security threats and destabilizing effects of Afghanistan may ripple over into their
countries. Without a proper response by each, they could see threats of their own
or possible terrorist groups acting in unison.

11. “Half of Afghanistan's Population Now Face Severe Hunger.” World Food Program USA.
12. Honderich, Holly, and Bernd Debusmann. “From Afghan Interpreter to US Homeless - The
Long Road to the American Dream.”

With the election of President Sadyr Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has only continued to
fuel nationalist sentiment and Islamic fervor. In outlawing Islamic political
groups, the oppressive rule of the President could and will spur more individuals
within Kyrgyzstan to join ISIS-K forces. When individuals feel targeted for their
religious or personal beliefs, some may look for an outlet or a group to latch on to.
Many of these individuals may join ISIS-K as returning from Afghanistan as
veterans of the war there. Seeing the disenfranchised Kyrgyz people, these ISIS-K
recruits could use Afghanistan as a road map to overthrow an unpopular
government and install an Islamic rule of their own. An Atlantic Council report
concludes that, “Allowing the government of Kyrgyzstan to entrench itself by
scapegoating the United States and other Western powers has the potential to fuel
dangerous anti-American sentiment that could manifest itself in organizations like
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which has recruited from
Kyrgyzstan.”13The Kyrgyz government is upsetting the more extreme elements of
Islamic fundamentalism in their country. Without a proper vetting of individuals
crossing from Afghanistan, some fighters may attempt to recruit more individuals.
The hardline veteran elements of the Afghanistan war may see the Kyrgyz
government as weak and try to lure individuals of their disenfranchised
population to the ISIS-K group.
Along with the possible ISIS forces returning home to Kyrgyzstan, there are also
the border problems that each of the Central Asian states faces. The countries
bordering Afghanistan, specifically, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan,
must deal with the possible refugees and possible fighters entering their countries.
A report by Mansur Mirovalev in Al Jazeera states, “All three ramped up security,
held military drills and moved more servicemen and weaponry to their borders
with the war-torn nation in recent weeks. Uzbekistan’s [border] is 150 kilometers
long (93 miles), and the main crossing across the Amu Darya River is the Sovietbuilt Friendship Bridge that has for decades been a major transport hub. So far,
more than a thousand refugees, including servicemen, have been let in since the
fall of Kabul and the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif that lies only 80 kilometers
(50 miles) from the border.”14 Thousands of refugees are already pouring into
Central Asian states. A claim that Uzbeks reportedly let in former Afghan vice
president and chameleonic strongman Abdul Rashid Dostum, a 67-year-old ethnic
Uzbek who sided with the Soviets, the US-backed mujahideen, the anti-Taliban

13. Posner, Lillian. “The Gathering Threat to the US in Kyrgyzstan.”
14. Mirovalev, Mansur. “Afghanistan's Central Asian Neighbours Panic, Reject Refugees.”
15. Ibid.

Northern Alliance, and the US-led NATO coalition has also surfaced.15 If these
countries are going to vet the individuals coming into their countries fully, they
will need the support and backing from some other countries to ensure that the
individuals they are allowing into the country are not linked to terrorist
organizations.
Having these border countries be the first ones to monitor who is crossing into
their countries allows them to deal with the more extremist elements instead of
having the United States intelligence be on the ground to deal with fundamentalist
elements of the region. The Central Asian states, in doing their own intelligence,
allow them to deter the hardliners and help stabilize the region.
Tajikistan, which shares a 1,347 km border with Afghanistan, has decided to take
a more prominent role in policing its border. In an article by Umida Hashimova in
The Diplomat, she reports that, “On July 5, Tajikistan ordered the mobilization of
20,000 military reservists for the reinforcement of country’s border with
Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s President also visited two Afghan-Tajik border posts to
check the readiness of military assets.”16 The Tajik government sees that they
must police their border alongside the other Central Asian states and take a more
direct role themselves instead of relying on other states. The Tajik government
knows what the Afghan withdrawal may mean and decided to start training with
military exercises. Another article by Umida Hashimova for the Diplomat
explains that, “On March 11-14, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan conducted their third
annual military exercises… Also in 2018, Tajikistan hosted the first military
exercise with Uzbekistan in August, in which the border troops of both counties
fought back notional Islamists entering from Afghanistan. Within a month of the
first exercise, Tajikistan hosted a larger anti-terrorism exercise in September
2018. One hundred Army officers from Uzbekistan and 500 Army officers from
Tajikistan participated.”17 The Central Asian states will have to ensure a ‘firm but
negotiable’ role when dealing with the Taliban government without isolating the
citizens of their own countries. The more authoritarian Central Asian states, if
they push too much against the more fundamentalist elements, may only hurt their
sovereignty.

16. Hashimova, Umida. “Greater Coordination in Central Asian Responses to Afghan Border
Troubles.”
17. Hashimova, Umida. “Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Engage in Joint Military Exercises.”

Continuing the military exercises by using their military instead of relying on the
United States or outside forces benefits the Central Asian states and the United
States. The United States, in a show of support for the enhanced roles that the
Central Asian states are playing, should be supportive of the military actions.
Having the Central Asian states take on the more prominent role of security in
Central Asia allows the United States some breathing room in the region and a
minor role for the United States to play.
The Central Asian states are aware that the Taliban takeover of the country could
have spillover effects into their regions. With the Central Asian states taking a
more significant role in the security of the area and their borders, it allows them to
understand better what is going on within Afghanistan and frees of American
spending on defense in Afghanistan.
The Central Asian states should be the first to have discussions with the
Taliban
The withdrawal from Afghanistan brought about some harsh realities. They will
have to rely more heavily on the Central Asian states to take a more front-seat
approach to security in the region, and it cannot change the society and culture of
a nation. Considering these lessons, the United States should rely more on
communication and intelligence equipment sales to Uzbekistan to cooperatively
work together to curb terrorism and continue to vet individuals coming into their
countries. The short-term goals of the United States are to be mindful of the
failures of Afghanistan and help the Central Asian states come to terms with those
failures. The Central Asian states will need funding to ensure they can take on
more robust security in the region while the United States takes a backseat role to
their security forces. There needs to be a realistic approach to looking at what
they may be and the United States' trade-offs to ensure that happens. It is not ideal
by any means to continue to fund other states’ militaries and training; however,
ensuring a 5-year commitment plan that that funding ends, with no option to
renew, will ensure better stabilization in the region. The Uzbeks are already
provided funding by the United States, but to stabilize the situation, Uzbeks have
the best position to help the situation and will need more funding.
The Uzbek Prime Minister, Sardor Umurzakov, met with the Taliban government
on October 16 to discuss “trade and economic interaction, ensuring border
security, cooperation in the field of energy, international cargo transportation, and
transit.”18 These discussions that the Uzbek government is already having with the
18. Radio Free Europe. “Uzbekistan Holds Talks with Taliban on Trade, Energy, Railway
Projects.”

Taliban government can be a start for stabilizing relations and the situation in
Afghanistan. These discussions with the Taliban government may allow further
talks on humanitarian grounds. The Uzbek government can lead the other Central
Asian states in different talks with the Taliban government and should continue to
do so. This dialogue opens the possibility of normalized discussions over matters
instead of going to war to solve problems.
The countries that border Afghanistan, specifically Uzbekistan, will need more
equipment to ensure a secure but peaceful negotiation with the Taliban
government. The State Department fact sheet states, “The United States has $79
million in open government-to-government sales cases with the Central Asian
states under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Uzbekistan is purchasing
equipment, valued at $40 million, for its armed forces through a combination of
national funds and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).”19 The United States will
have to continue to expand this program to allow the countries to do the process
themselves of defending against Islamic fundamentalism. These sales need to be
communication and intelligence-based, and no offensive technology should be
sold to the Central Asian states. More training to police their borders free up the
United States to be a second vetting process for individuals if the Central Asian
states' vetting process is not as thorough. The equipment sold should not be high
technology drones or offensive capabilities but instead more communications
equipment, and training on that equipment, so that they can better suit their border
control needs. Allowing the Central Asian states to protect themselves instead of
relying on American forces defeats multiple problems. They will need the tools,
mainly the equipment and border patrols, to vet fundamentalist elements
correctly. Although the Taliban have stated they will not go into other Central
Asian states, the ISIS-K group wants a larger Islamic Caliphate. To reduce the
likelihood of those fundamentalist elements, the Central Asian states will have to
vet those entering and defend the national sovereignty of their borders.
The United States’ change in policy must have Central Asian states taking
the lead role.
Firstly, allowing the Central Asian states more funding reduces the likelihood of
American forces being used in border control actions alongside the Central Asian
states. The United States may see a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan akin to
mass starvation and want to re-intervene in Afghanistan. This policy will only
allow the United States to get drawn into a more significant conflict again and be
right back at square one with Afghanistan. By allowing the Central Asian states to
19. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Central Asia - United States Department of State.” U.S.
Department of State.

take a more direct approach to police their borders, they are responsible for what
happens. They can better help with the humanitarian problems—allowing them to
get the tools needed to combat the extremist elements that may want to enter the
countries, more cooperation between the states will be required. The Central
Asian states should continue to vet those returning to Central Asia to ensure that
fundamentalist elements do not spread. The Central Asian states have a common
heritage, background, and history that they can leverage to negotiate and patrol
their borders. By having American forces doing it, Americans are seen as
imperialists in the region for their own gains. We must ensure that American
forces take the backseat to reduce the unpopular image of American troops abroad
in search of monsters.
Secondly, allowing Central Asian states to take a more prominent role in
defending their national sovereignty could help limit the American forces sent to
Central Asia. The United States has two bases in Central Asia in which a report
by CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) states, “The United States maintains two
bases in Central Asia, one each in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for its postwar
operations in Afghanistan.”20 Having American military forces in Central Asia
only ensures more nationalist and fundamentalist sentiment among the
populations to push out the American forces. The Central Asian states, in taking
the more prominent role of their security, ensure that Tajiks are defending
Tajikistan, Uzbeks are defending Uzbekistan, and so on. This change reduces the
chance of unpopular foreign American forces taking the leading role in fighting
possible fundamentalist elements.
Next, the United States Congress should advocate for higher spending within the
NDAA to support counterterrorism efforts of the Central Asian states. The state
department fact sheet concludes, “Central Asia FMF historically has ranged from
between $3-5 million per year, though Congress appropriated $10 million in
F.Y. 2021. The United States, under the FMF program, has supported border
security and counterterrorism capabilities of partner security forces in Central
Asia, including through the provision of vehicles, communications equipment,
training, and sustainment.”21 The Central Asian states will need more funding to
ensure that their borders are secure and have the proper resources. Providing that
the sales to Uzbekistan and the Central Asian states are limited to communication
equipment and border patrol equipment ensures that the region's stabilization is
put first instead of offensive equipment to destabilize the region further. By being
precise with the equipment sold to the central Asian states, the United States can
20. Beehner, Lionel. “Asia: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia.”
21. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Central Asia - United States Department of State.” U.S.
Department of State.

ensure the best of U.S. technology, and arms are not used in any offensive wars.
The United States must maintain that offensive arms are not going to be the way
to ensure stabilization, but a ‘strong and negotiable’ dialogue continues between
the Central Asian states and the Taliban government. The cost of continued
American operations in Central Asia, especially with trying to mitigate the
Taliban, is astronomically impossible to do. The Central Asian states will need
more funding to do it themselves, but that is a small drop in the bucket of the
NDAA and what the Afghanistan war has already cost the United States. Instead
of spending trillions of dollars to change Afghanistan into a democratic state, the
Central Asian states should defend their borders and use their intelligence
operations to see what fundamentalist groups are working there. The cost tradeoff between re-intervention by the United States or possible short-term funding of
Uzbekistan to provide that security for the region is best suited.
The hard lessons of Afghanistan will mean that the United States needs
Central Asia to step up
The Central Asian states’ security must have them take a more prominent role in
stabilizing Afghanistan. The Taliban government wants stabilization to occur so
that they do not have to fight with ISIS-K forces, and the Central Asian states can
help facilitate those discussions. Americans would much more likely favor
funding other countries instead of having American soldiers do the heavy lifting
against fundamentalist groups abroad. Americans need to have a realistic
approach to what Central Asia may look like in the future and how they will need
to engage with the region.
Allowing for more cooperation between the Central Asian states and having them
take over the main haul of military border operations grants them the opportunity
to be responsible for their security. The United States would look like a more
reliable ally if the United States were not consistently involved with having troops
on the ground of many of these countries. Having the Central Asian states take
over the leading role in which they have a vested interest looks better to the
international community and the Muslim communities of the Central Asian states.
It allows the United States to achieve a better international image if they were not
always having their soldiers garrisoned in many countries worldwide to ‘stabilize’
a region.
The possible refugee crisis and humanitarian problems that Afghanistan has for
the region can only destabilize the region unless the Central Asian states start to
take more responsibility for what happens next door. The withdrawal from
Afghanistan should be studied, and better relations with the Central Asian states

will have to be fostered. A possible re-intervention policy in Afghanistan will
only continue to drain the United States through financial means and ensure that
even more of our military members must fight in a drawn-out conflict.
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